ORIGIN AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS OF ANCIENT
FERRIES.
The law of ancient ferries is a fertile field for research into
the early growth.of our legal institutions. The numerous cases
which assert that ancient ferries can be had either by a grant from
the sovereign or prescription do not explain their origin.' That
every ferry is not an ancient ferry and that the law applicable
to ancient ferries is quite different from that of ordinary ferries
is evident from the cases. 2 In order to understand how this
privilege or franchise grew up, one must first understand the law
of tolls of which the toll for ferriage, called passage,3 is a part.
In the old abridgements there is no special treatment of the law
applicable to ferries, but it is to be found either under the head4
ings "Franchise", or "Tolls".
In legal phraseology the word "toll" has been used, as is
customary in the English language, to express two different legal
rights. A toll most properly speaking is the payment for the right
to buy and sell at a fair within the precincts of a manor.5 This
toll was paid by the buyer of the goods at the fair to the owner
of the market and it was an indictable offense for the lord to
accept toll from the seller.6 Its origin, according to the ancient
Mirror of Justice 7 dates back to a statute passed in the reign of
King Alfred. By this statute it was enacted that fairs and markets should be held in specified places and that the buyer should
pay a toll to the bailiffs of the lords of the markets. This toll
was evidence of a contract made in public since all private or
1

However a good discussion can be found in Mr. Justice Story's dissent
in the Charles River Bridge Case. infra, note 71.
2 Letton .v. Godden, L. R. 2 Eq. i22 (Eng. I866).
* Blount's Law Dict. (1679) ; Sheppard's Abridg. IIu (1675).
' 13 Viner's Abridg. 5o6, under "Franchises", and I7 Ibid. 289, under
"Tolls"; 5 Comyn's Abridg. 2o, under "Piscary"; Sheppard's Abridg., under

"Tolls".

'Terms de la Ley (1675); Sheppard's Abridg. ii9; 17 Viner's Abridg.
2 .

'Coke's Second Inst. 221. citing 2 & 3 Ph. & Mar., and 31 Eliz.
'This treatise was written in 1675 and is generally attributed to Andrew
Home; see excellent translation of it in Selden Society list.
(718)
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secret contracts had been prohibited. The statute provided a
certain list of tolls, but no toll was to exceed one penny for one
kind of merchandise. Sir Edward Coke accepted this as the true
explanation of the origin of tolls. This toll was not an incident
to the fair 8 and had to be held by prescription or exist in the
same grant which created the fair;9 a grant of a right to take toll
subsequent to the grant of the fair was void as an oppression.' 0
There were divers other tolls and the peculiar feature about
each one is that there was a service rendered for the sum exacted.
They may be roughly grouped into those which pertained to
towns and fairs; those which pertained to ports of entry; those
which pertained to highways. Those which pertained to markets
and towns were: stallage, a toll for setting up a stall in the market;
picage, for the privilege of digging up ground in a market for
a stall ;"1 toll-turn, for beasts driven to the fair which were not
sold 12 (this could only be claimed by ancient custom or prescription and not by grant) ;13 murage, for the keeping of the wall of
the city as a defense and paid by all who enter.14 The tolls which
were associated with ports of entry were: wharfage, for the
privilege of landing goods upon, or loading them from a wharf ;15
tonnage, for weighing;"8 cranage, for the drawing of merchandise out of ships to the wharf ;17 anchorage, for the privilege of
'Anon, 7 Mod. 12 (Eng. 1701).
'Supra, note 6. at page 220.

1Bracton (Legibus Angliae, Lib. II, Chap. 24, s. 3), also speaks of Toll
in the sense of a liberty to be free from toll. In Blount's Law Dictionary
(167o) under "Toll" is the following: "Of this freedom from toll, the City
of Coventry boasts of an ancient charter granted by Leofric (or Luriche)
Merciorum Comes who at the importunity of Godiva, his virtuous Lady,
granted this Freedom to that city; and in Richard the Second's time (according to Mr. Dugdale on his description of Warwickshire) the picture of him
and his lady was set up in the South-Window of Trinity Church there, holding in his right hand a Charter, with these words written thereon:
'I Luriche for the love of thee
Do grant Coventry Toll-free."'
"'Sheppard's Abridg. 119.
-Terms de la Ley (1615), 185. This toll was paid on the return from
the fair. Blount's Law Dict.-"Toll."
"Coke's Second Inst. 221.
16Supra, note ii.
1'3 Bouvier Law Dict. 3450 (3d Rawle Revision, 1914).

"Jehu Webbs Case, 8 Coke Rep. 45b, 46b (i6o8).
'T Ibid.
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casting an anchor from ship in a port."" The last general class
is the one which is especially applicable to the question at hand
and embraces those tolls which were exacted for the privilege of
travelling on highways. Pontage was a toll for the right to cross
over a bridge ;19 pavage, for the right to travel on a highway and
was used for the paving of a street or causeway; 20 passage, for
21
the transporting of man, beast or goods over water by boat.
All these secondary tolls are divisible with respect to their
origin into two classes: (i) Toll traverse; (2) Toll thorough.

A toll traverse was properly a payment of a certain sum for
passing over the soil of another on a way not a high street. This
was the definition given by Mr. justice Thorp as early as 1344.22
The toll lay in prescription; in fact Fitzherbert says that the tolltaker must justify it by usuage time out of mind for he already
had his ordinary remedy by damage feasant.23 Anyone who had
a right to charge a toll traverse could demand the toll from every
one, even the King. There could be no grants of toll free from
this species of toll, 24 as there could be from the toll thorough.

A toll thorough is properly a toll taken of men for passing
through a vill on the public highway. 25 At a very early date it
was the law that no one could have such a toll either by grant or
prescription. 26 The reason was that the highway was open to
all and a grant by the King to one which enabled him to charge
the people for being where they had a lawful right to be was
void as an oppression.27 Neither could it be gained by prescription
1I

Bouvier's Law Dict.

192

(3d Rawle Revision, 1914).

"Supra, note 16.
"Supra, note ii. Coke, supra,note i6, called it pannagium, but the editor
states that this term is properly a liberty for hogs to feed on acorns, etc.
' Supra, note i6.
222
Ass. 58. See also, Smith v. Shepherd, 7 Croke Eliz. 710 (16oo);
Heshord v. Wills, I Sidf. Rep. 454 (1671).
2 Fitzherbert's Abridg. "Toll", pl. 3.
"Lord Berkley's Case, 46 Edw. III (1372), cited in Plowden's Comm. 236.
Supra, note 22.
Ibid.
"Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 227 (518, 8th ed.), citing 22 Ass. 58;
17 Viner's Abridg. 295. This appears to have been the early rule. Heddy
v. Welhouse, Moore Rep. 474 (I598).
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because the right of the King's subjects to go on the King's highway antedated any supposed grant from time immemorial, and
hence the presumption that the toll had a legal origin was impossible. 28 But later the idea grew up that if consideration was
shown for charging this toll, then a toll thorough was good. 29
This quid pro quo upheld a grant from the Crown and it also
seived the useful purpose of negativing the effect of the rule in
prescription, that the people had a right to travel on highway free
of charge. In several cases some of the judges doubted whether
they could inquire into the original consideration of the toll
thorough; inasmuch as the toll has been claimed from time immemorial, the court would be forced to presume it had a legal
30
origin.
Whether or not the court was precluded from inquiring into
the original status of a toll thorough may be a proper question
for academic discussion, but it is of no practical importance.
Every toll thorough could be supported on some form of consideration or public benefit. Among the various duties which have
been held sufficient to support the toll are: the repairing of a
bridge ;31 the paving of a street or causeway ;32 reparation of a
sea bank ;33 the building of a wharf ;34 the maintenance of city
walls for defensive purposes.3 5 In towns a toll for passing
through was supported in one of several ways. If the route was
made shorter this fact would support the toll for there would be
a public benefit; and in addition the liability of repair was on the
part of the lord. 36 In the old town the whole area originally
SHeddy v. Welhouse, supra, note 27; Freeman v. Walgham, 2 Wilson,

296 (766).

'Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 227 notes (p. 57, 8th ed.), citing Y. B.
14 Edw. III, Bar. 275 (1340) ; Y. B. 5 Hen. VII, IO (49o).
'Smith v. Shepherd, Croke Eliz. 710 (i6oo) s. c. Moore, 574; James v.
Johnson,
i Mod. Rep. 23, (677).
1
Supra, note 16.
" Supra, notes ii and 20.
'The King v. Corporation of Boston, W. Jones Rep. 162 (1628).
" Supra, note I5.- In Yarmouth v. Eaton, 3 Bwn. 1402 (1742), Lord Mansfield said, "the making of a port is itself a consideration, it may never
require repairs; therefore I do not know that it is necessary to show repairs."
'Supra, note ii.
'Warrington v. Morely, Combes Rep. 295, 297 (1694).
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belonged to the lord of the manor and as it was originally his soil
he could plead the toll as a toll traverse, and relieve himself of
showing a quid pro quo.37 It has also been said that the mere
fact that the lord of the manor had granted a way to the public
was sufficient consideration from which a toll thorough could be
presumed.3 1.
Passage,39 therefore, would come under the classification of
a toll thorough, for a ferry is a public highway 40 and he who
pays toll can demand transportation. The old abridgements and
dictionaries classified the ferry as a privilege which could demand
a toll thorough. Yet it appears to have grown up at the time
when a toll thorough could not be claimed by either prescription
or grant, for as early as 1444, Mr. Chief Justice Newton 41 speaks
of an "ancient ferry". It is not unlikely that the ferry grew up
as a private crossing and was gradually dedicated to the public.
In the early law the rule was that the owner of a ferry had to
own on both sides of the stream. 42 This indicates that the
traveller would have to cross the ferryman's land in order to
reach the ferry. As the ferryman was the riparian owner on both
sides of the stream, the road by ferry was only a continuation of
his private road across the freehold and hence any toll that he
would collect would be a toll traverse, for it has always been the
law that a toll traverse was chargeable for passing over a private
bridge or ferry. 43 And as it was a toll traverse, the owner, if he
could show a reasonable toll from time immemorial, was protected in his ancient ferry.
ITPrideaux v. Warne,

(695).

2

Lev. 96 (1673); Crispe v. Belwood, 3 Lev. 424

"Lord Pelham v. Pickersgill, i T. R. 66o (1787).
" It is also called ferriage by Kelham in his Norman-French Dictionary
(1799), page io3.
"2 Danes Abridg. 683 (Mass. 1823).
'Y. B. 22 Hen. VI, pl. i4b.
,2Savile's Rep. ii, pl. 29 (1581), and the reason was that the ferry franchise
is in respect to the landing place and not in respect to the water, for if the
owner did not own on both sides of the water he could not land. This harsh
rule has been overthrown, Peter v. Kendal, 6 B. & C. 703 (Eng. 1827), where
it was-held that the owner did not have to have a property in the soil, only
a right to land, such as on a highway. Cf. Chambers v. Furry, i Yeates, 167

(Pa. 1792).

"Heshord v. Wills, supra, note 22.
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After all it makes little difference whether the ferry toll
grew up as a toll traverse or as a toll thorough. It is certain
that since 1444, when Mr. Justice Newton said the main reason
for protecting an ancient ferry from infringement was that the
owner was bound to keep it always in repair for the people or be
severely fined, it has been considered as a toll thorough. The
quid pro quo for the privilege was the public benefit that was
derived from having at all times a suitable form of transportation across streams and rivers. The toll had to be reasonable;
hence the courts were never impressed with the idea that the
people would be oppressed by such a monopoly.""
Sir Matthew Hale in commenting on the King's rights in
waters said that he has a "right of franchise or privilege, that
no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers, without
a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the King.
He may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his family,
but not for the common use of all the King's subjects passing
that way; because it doth in consequence tend to a common
charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use, and
every man for his passage pays a toll, which is a common
charge.

.

.

."'

And still earlier, Sheppard in his Abridge-

ment in speaking of tolls, wrote "that they were originally by
King's grant, but now are claimed and may be had by prescription." It is interesting to note that in all the older cases dealing
with ancient ferries the franchise was based not upon a grant,
but upon prescription; a charter was never cited as the basis of
the right. The declaration or pleas always stated that the owner
of the ferry and his predecessors in title had been possessed of
this privilege time out of mind.4
If, as counsel said in Churchman v. Tunstal,47 "a ferry is a
franchise, and a flower of the Crown which a private man :annot
"What was a reasonable toll appears to have been a question for the court
to decide. Coke, Second Inst. 222; Gard v. Callard, 6 M. & S. 69 (Eng. 1817).
' Hargrave's Law Tracts, 6.
"For cases involving grants of ancient ferries from the Crown, see Pim
v. Carrell, infra, note 99; Cowes Case, infra, note 99; General Estates Company v. Beaver, infra, note 63.
*Hardres

Rep. 162, 163 (1659).
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set up without a license", 4s it is hard to understand how prescription could perfect title in the user. However, the cases cited by
counsel do not bear him out. In one of the cases Chief Justice
Newton speaks of an ancient ferry in such a way as to lead one
to believe he meant a ferry by prescription. But nevertheless .it
is old law that "a man can't prescribe in things which touch the
Crown", 49 and "a prescription does not run against the King
where he has a right".5" Yet along with these rules it was always
the-law that a toll could be gained by prescription. 1 There are
two theories which may explain this apparent contradiction.
If the true origin of the ferry was from the law of toll
traverse, then the operation being upon the private land-of the
individual, the King could not complain. It would be a business
where the King would have no special rights. And so when the
idea of ferries had grown up to be fully recognized, and they
were held to be in public service, the only way the court could
protect the owner was to hold that by immemorial use he had
obtained a franchise.
Then, again, it was possible for the King to have granted
this franchise, for there is no doubt but that ferries were necessary and useful in the development of commerce and the country.
As was said by Mr. Chief Justice Gascoigne :52 "The King can
charge the people of the realm without special assent of the
commons on a thing that is a benefit to the people." By the
application of the rule of immemorial use the court in order to
protect the ferryman was compelled to presume the possible
grant from the King. The obligation of the ferryman at all
times to keep the ferry in proper condition for use was sufficient
consideration to outweigh the rule that a toll thorough was
against common right and an oppression to the people. If a toll
could lie in prescription, 53 there seems to be no reason why a
Citing Y. B. ii Hen. VI, 23 (1433); 22 Hen. VI, 14 (i444).
"Viner's Abr.idg., "Prescription", citing Brooke Lect's, Stat. Lim. 39.
48

Ibid., citing 38 Ass.

22

(364).

" Coke Litt. 114b.
"213 Hen. IV, i4b (1412).
"Bracton (Lib.'II, Chap. 24, s. 3, "But in other things, where proof is
necessary, time runs against the King himself, as against others." And then
he discusses inter alia the prescriptive right to take toll.

ORIGIN AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS OF ANCIENT FERRIES 725

ferry which was only one form of charging toll could not be
gained by the same method. It is noticeable that all the tolls
were to a certain extent necessary for the safety and development
of the people. Murage kept up the walls for defense; pontage,
passage and pavage made travel possible.
On this side of the Atlantic the courts are not in accord on
the question of prescriptive rights in a ferry. Some of the
States follow the English rule and hold that after a continued
use the presumption may be drawn that the franchise had a
legal origin.5 4 Others repudiate this method of gaining a ferry
franchise and hold with Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that :5 "The right of navigation, transverse or otherwise, being enjoyed in common is susceptible of exclusive appropriation only by grant from the public
to whom it belongs; and we have, consequently, no such a thing

as prescriptive right or prescriptive grant of exclusive navigation
from length of time. The doctrine of nulitin tempus alone
would prevent a title drawn from a source so like the statute of
limitations, from being set up against the commonwealth or her
The cases which follow this rule contain the
grantee." 56
erroneous quotation from the English cases and text-books to
the effect that a franchise could be gained only by grant from
"*Milton v. Haden, 32 Ala. 3o (1855), in a suit by lessor of an ancient
ferry against lessee for rents, held that after thirty years of continuous use,
when the right of franchise is collaterally drawn in question, a presumption
will be indulged in that the grant had legal origin. But there is dicta in

Tuscaloosa County v. Foster, 132 Ala. 392 (I9Ol), to the effect that a fran-

chise for a ferry cannot be gained by prescription. Williams v. Turner, 7
Ga. 348 (1849) ; Hudspeth v. Hall, iii Ga. 510 (1goo), but will not presume
an exclusive grant, Shorter v. Smith, 9 Ga. 517. Barrington v. Meuse Ferry
Co., 69 N. Car. 165 (1873), forty years or less will raise a presumption of a
grant from the State. Dicta in McGowan v. Stark. 1 N. & McC. 387, 9 Am.
Dec. 712 (S. Car. I818) ; City of Laredon v. Martin, 52 Tex. 548 (188o).
" Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts, 436 (Pa. 1839). However, the foundation of
what is nearly as effective, is the power which the owners of the shores have
to control the subservient and indispensable right of embarking and landing.
The existence of such a power over even the termini of public roads is established in Chambers v. Furry, I Yeates, 167 (Pa. 1792); Cooper v. Smith, 9
S. & R. 27 (Pa. 1822); Chess v. Manawn, 3 Watts, 219 (Pa. 1834).
'Accord: Murray v. Menefee, 20 Ark. 561 (1859) ; Trustees of Schools v.
27 (1851); Scott v. Wilson, ii S. W. Rep. 303 (Ky. 1889), but
Tatman, 13 Ill.
see Davis v. Connley, 46 S. W. Rep. 679 (Ky. 1898); Sullivan v. Board of
Supervisors, 58 Miss. 790 (i88i), overruling McFadden v. Board of Supervisors, 57 Miss. 618 (188o).
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the Crown. 57 And some courts failed to appreciate that what
was meant by franchise was only that the riparian owner had
not, as an incident to the ownership of the land, the right to erect
a public ferry and charge a toll.58 The term "franchise" did not
exclude the possibility of gaining the right by prescription, for
other franchises besides tolls could be gained by prescription. 59
The idea of the benefit and recompense to the people at
large which is derived from the ferry distinguishes the case from
that where a subject and his ancestors have been squatters on the
King's land for centuries. It is admitted that although one can
dwell on the Crown's land forever-and-a-day, nevertheless he
can be ejected, for in such a case the statute does not run against
the Crown. But it seems that if one can establish an ancient
ferry by prescription, it would be valid even as against the
Crown. No direct case has been found, although there - are
several which approach this decision. In Year Book, 2; Hen.
VI, i4b (1444), Mr. Chief Justice Newton said, in the course
of an argument, that if one had an ancient ferry and another
built another ferry so near to the ancient ferry that the profits
were impaired, the ferryman had an action on the case because
he was obligated to keep it in repair for the people or he would
be severely amerced and brought before the Justices in Eyre.
The second ferry the Chief Justice had in mind surely must have
been a ferry by grant of patent, for there were only two possible
ways to obtain a ferry franchise, by grant or prescription. It
could not have been by prescription, for immemorial use could
not have been proved. If the owner of the second ferry was not
protected by his grant from the Crown, it would seem that in
such a case the Crown could not have ousted the owner of the
ancient ferry by a quo warranto proceeding. The same idea is
brought out in Keeble v. Hickeringall,60 where Mr. Chief Justice
Holt said:
" Excellent examples of this can be found in Appeal of James E. Douglass, 118 Pa. 65 (888) ; Greensboro Ferry Co. v. New Geneva Ferry Co., 34
Pa. C. C. Rep. 33 (1907).
" Williams v. Turner, infra, note 62.
" See Viner's Abridgement, "Franchises".
"Holts Rep. 20 (1702) s. c. go Eng. Rep. (Full Reprint) 9o8.
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"In some cases you could not set up a franchise, tho' you
have Letters Patents for it; as if I have a Ferry, I will bring
an action against you for setting up another, for that I am
obliged to keep up mine for the good of the Publick, which
would be hard upon me if you got all the Profit."'
In both cases emphasis is laid upon the obligation incurred
by the owner of the ancient ferry as the basis of his protection,
but it is evident that the public benefit is the real reason. If the
owner of the ancient ferry is not allowed to have the monopoly
he cannot keep up the ferry in a way useful to the public, and
hence the public would suffer. Just at this point the case of a
ferry gained by prescription and of the attempt to gain the
Crown's land by adverse possession differs. In the later case
there is no public benefit; all the benefit would come to the
adverse possessor and hence he is not protected.
Although many of the ancient ferries have been in use from
time immemorial, nevertheless there is no one stated period
during which a ferry must have been in existence before the jury
can presume a grant from the sovereign. The periods required
vary from seven years0 2 to six hundred years. 63 It is a question
of fact for the jury to determine whether there was an ancient
grant, 64 and the courts will seek to aid in the presumption of a
legal origin of a right to charge tolls. 65 The law was very well
stated in Trotter v. Harris,0 which involved an action on the
" The better mode of obtaining protection today would be by a bill in
equity to restrain the operation of the second ferry. The case of Churchman
v. Tunstal, Hardres Ex. Rep. 162 (1659), refusing a bill on the ground that
monopoly was bad, and no precedent for the toll is bad law and it was
reversed in i662, see Huzzy v. Field, 2 C. M. & R. 432, 441 (Eng. 1835);
Dysart v. Hammerton, infra, note 99; General Estates, Co. v. Beaver, infra,
note 63.
'*Williams v. Turner, 7 Ga. 348 (1849), on an analogy to the statute of
limitations for hereditaments.
" General Estates Co. v. Beaver, iii L. T. Rep. 951 (Eng. Feb. 1915),
which contains a very interesting history of that ancient ferry.
" Chichester v. Lethbridge, Willes Rep. 71 (Eng. 1738) ; Mayor of Hull v.
Homer, Cowp. Rep. 102 (Eng. 1774).
'Richards v. Bennett, i B. & C. 223 (Eng. 1823).
0 Y. & J. 285 (Eng. i828). Various years have been held to have sustained
the presumption: 350 years use by- a city to charge a wharf toll, Mayor of
Hull v. Homer, supra, note 64; 7o years, Hudspeth v. Hall, supra, note 54;
40 years, or less, Barrington v. Meuse Ferry Co., supra, note 54; 30 years,

Milton v. Haden, supra, note 54.
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case for the disturbance of a ferry. The plaintiff alleged that
he was possessed of an ancient ferry and proved continuous
possession for thirty-five years. Upon a verdict for the plaintiff
it was held by Lord Chief Baron Alexander:
"I agree that the commencement of a ferry must be by
royal grant or license from the Crown, and that the grant must
be shown or such evidence of ancient use must be adduced, as
will satisfy the jury that it originally had that commencement,
although the grant may not be forthcoming. But I can see no
difference tbetween this and other ordinary cases of prescription."'
Baron Hillock said:
"The word 'ancient,' usually found in declarations upon
this subject, does not impose upon the plaintiff the necessity of
producing the grant from the Crown, but is satisfied by proving
that the ferry has existed for such a time, as will raise the presumption of its being originally founded on right. If it be
shown that the ferry had existed for a length of time, and the
possession of the plaintiff be proved, that is sufficient to maintain the action.

.

.

. We find the plaintiff in the possession

of the ferry, in the exercise of a right, which if it could not
exist but by deed, must have been presumed to have been legally
created."
Since the ferryman was obliged to have his ferry running
at all times, it was necessary for the public not to hinder him in
the performance of his obligation. As early as 1581 Savile6"
recorded that a ferryman "is privileged from being impressed as
a soldier or otherwise. And it was so said in the case of the
Inhabitants of Ipswich and Phm. Brown". This has been since
recognized in Ex Parte Fox,6 9 where Mr. Justice Buller said
"But after so long a possession (36 years) I would presume anything
in favor of the plaintiff (party in possession claiming grant)," Willes, J., in
Roger v. Brooks, i T. R. 43 n. (Eng. 1784). "Now I apprehend that where
there has been a long continued possession in assertion of a right, it is a
well settled principle of English law, that the right should be presumed to
have had a legal origin, if such legal origin was possible, and that the courts
will presume that those acts were done and those circumstances existed
which were necessary to the creation of a valid title," Lord Herschell in
Phillips v. Hallidy, 64 L. T. Rep. 745 (Eng. i8gi). Hence that which was
stated in Walter v. Gunner, i Haggard Com. Rep. 314 (Eng. 1798), to the
effect that the possession must be ancient' and go beyond memory, 1uf not
high-legal memory, cannot be taken as a rule of law in each case.
UPage

ir,pl. 29.

5 T. R. 276 (Eng. 1793).
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that the only case of exemption from being impressed by the
government which does not rest upon the statute is of a ferryman.
The public aid is also shown in the fact that the English
courts always construed the ancient ferry franchise to be an
exclusive monopoly. This is interesting in view of the well
settled rule that all grants from the Crown are construed strongly
against the grantee.
The basic reason for this ruling is found in the utilitarian
policy that what is best for the greatest number is the law. In
1444 Mr. Chief Justice Newton gave as the reason for this
protection that the ferryman was compellable to have adequate
service and keep the ferry in proper condition. If he was bound
to do this, then the law must in turn protect him from competition which would likely be ruinous to him.70 The courts were
never alarmed over such a monopoly because the toll could only
be reasonable, and hence they had the complete supervision of
them. 71 It was better for all concerned that one person have an
exclusive monopoly, than that there be competition which in the
end may be disastrous. The remedy afforded the owner of the
ancient ferry to protect himself from competition was at first
by an action upon the case,72 but later a more complete remedy
was afforded by a bill in equity.7 3 Then, too, the Crown could
always act in such a case against the second ferryman by quo
warranto.74 Of course all these actions would be futile if the
second ferry had been erected after an ad quod dannum. This
writ was issued out of chancery commanding the sheriff to find
by a jury what damage would be caused to the Crown or any
To
22 Hen. VI, i4b. The injury to the owner of the ancient ferry is not
in the gain made by the new ferry, but in the decrease of the tolls of his
ferry, therefore a free ferry would be just as objectionable. Long v. Beard,
3 Mur. 57 (N. C. 1819).
..Churchman v. Tunstal; infra, note 73. It is interesting to note that the
toll was hardly ever specified in the grant when such grant existed. Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. i4, page 56o.
Blisset v. Hart, Willes Rep. 5o8 (Eng. 1744).
, Churchman v. Tunstal, Hard. 162; 2 Anst. 6o8 (Eng. i659, reversed in
1662); Cory v. Yarmouth & Norwich R. Co., 3 Hare. 594; 67 W. R. 516
(Eng. 1844).
. :', Blisset v.. Hart, supra, note 72.
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other to grant a new franchise for a ferry.75 If the verdict was
that no damage would be done, then no action would lie as the
matter would be res judicata.
In those American jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine
of ancient ferries there is a division as to whether the grant will
be presumed to be exclusive or not. In Shorter v. Smith7 it was
ruled that there could be no presumption that an ancient ferry
had an exclusive monopoly. The reason for the rule was the
same as controlled the decision of the Charles River Bridge
Case ;77 namely, that it is contrary to the political institutions of
this country to infer that a franchise grant is exclusive. A contrary result was reached in other jurisdictions which strictly
followed the English law. 78
To the general rule that an ancient ferry-has an exclusive
monopoly there are several qualifications or exceptions. (i) The
monopoly is only of a crossing by ferry and not a monopoly of
all modes of transportation across the river. (2) The obligation
perpetually to keep up and run the ferry in proper condition must
be present. (3) The doctrine of "new traffic" must be recognized.
i. It seems strange that the courts would rule that an
ancient ferry was protected from infringement by another ferry,
and yet would not go the whole way and hold that it was protected from all competition. The reason for the rule of monopoly
seems as applicable if the infringement be by bridge. But the
law is otherwise, and the reason is that the courts would not
allow the development of a community to be restricted by the
fact that an ancient ferry had to be protected; if other modes of
transportation were more beneficial to the country, the ancient
ferry must give way.7 9 The rule may be stated to be that the
owner of an ancient ferry has not an exclusive grant of trans,si Bouvier Law Dict.
Patrick, infra, note 8o.
is9 Ga. 517 (185).

z32

(Rawle, 3d Revision, z914). See also Paine v.

ii Peters, 419 (U. S. 1837).
'Long v. Beard, supra, note 70; Smith v. Harkins, 3 Ired. Eq. 613;

(N. Car. 1845); Barrington v. Meuse Ferry Co., supra, note s4; Stark v.
McGowen, supra, note 54.
"Dibden v. Skirrow, [I9o8] i Cl. 41 (Eng.); I Brit. R. Cases, 332,
opinion of Farrell, L J.
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porting passengers and goods across the stream by any means
whatever, but only a grant of an exclusive right to carry them
0
the plaintiff sued the
across by a ferry. In Pain v. Patrick"
owner of an ancient ferry for refusing to ferry him. The
defence was that the defendant had erected a bridge across the
stream in place of the ferry he had abandoned. It was ruled
that the defence "is not good, because the erecting of a bridge is
but a laying out of a way; it is a voluntary act, and no man by
reason of his own act can be discharged of what he is to do, upon
the interest he hath in the ferry".8 1
2
In commenting upon this decision, Lord Justice Mellishs
seems a clear decision that he [the ferryman] has not
said: '-'It
a grant of every mode of carrying goods and passengers across;
for if he had he would surely be entitled, if not bound, to provide
the best means of crossing." This certainly is the logical result
of the case, for if the grant was to transport people across, it
would make no difference to the court how the people were
transported. The Lord Justice's explanation of the theory of the
grant is quite clear; he said:
"The first grantee of the ferry is supposed to have represented to the Crown that it would be for the public advantage
that a ferry should be established in the particular locality, and,
then, in consideration of the grantee undertaking perpetually to
keep up the ferry, the Crown has granted to him the exclusive
right of ferrying within certain limits. There is nothing in the
nature of this transaction which would lead me to believe that
the Crown intended to guarantee or had power to guarantee,
the grantee of the ferry against changes of circumstances and
future discoveries of an entirely different method of transit by
which ferrying might be superseded. The Crown professes to
03 Mod. Rep. 289 (Eng. 16go). This distinction between right to ferry and
other modes of crossing is not always kept in mind, see Williams v. Turner,
supra, note 62.
'u And a person entitled under an act to build a bridge and a ferry cannot
substitute a ferry for the bridge and leave the bridge unrepaired, Nichol v.
Allen, i B. & S. 916 (Eng. 1862).
UHopkins v. Great Northern R. Co., 2 Q. B. D. 224 (1877). Here was a
suit by an owner of an ancient ferry for disturbance of an exclusive franchise. The defendant railway, under the authority of an act, constructed
across the river, a half a mile above this ancient ferry, a railway bridge, and
a foot-bridge which was to be used by persons going to the railway station
and other places. The traffic on the ferry rapidly declined and the ferry
was abandoned. Held: No recovery.
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protect the grantee against the competition of other persons
who are in the same line of business and do the same things
that he does; but he appears to run the risk of any change of
circumstances, which may render ferrying at that place useless. . . . It seems to us by no means clear that a person
building a bridge over a stream, even in the line of a ferry,
would be liable to an action by the owner of the ferry. It is
true that the opening of a new bridge might be as prejudicial,
or indeed much more prejudicial, to the property of the owner
of the ferry than the setting up of a rival ferry; but the one
does, and the other does not, involve the direct doing of the very
thing the exclusive right to do which has been granted to the
owner of the ferry; and it seems to be extending the-principle
of liability for an indirect violation of the rights of the owner
of the ferry to-an unreasonable extent, to hold that it extends
to make a person liable to an action, who has not ferried or
carried passengers by boat at all."' a3

Although this may be considered obiter, nevertheless it was
84
followed and affirmed in Dibden v. Skirrow, and plainly shows
that the courts are not going to allow the owners of ancient ferry
rights to clog the wheels of progressive transportation. The
only case upon which the Lord Justice had a doubt was where a

"The reasoning of Reg. v. Cambridge Rwy. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 422 (Eng.

1871), was overthrown by this case. In that case the railway was empowered

to build a railway bridge and footbridge across a river some several hundred
yards above an ancient ferry. It was empowered to receive toll from those
using it, and the consequence was that the profits of the ferry were greatly
impaired. Held: That the owner of the ferry was entitled to damages for
infringement Lord Blackburn said: "The prosecutor's right is to a ferry,
or a franchise, by which he had the exclusive right of, carrying passengers
across the river." It is submitted that this definition is incorrect in the light
of Paine v. Patrick, supra, note 8o. It is only an exclusive franchise to
carry by ferry. "It is well established that if that right is interfered with,
without the authority of an Act of Parliament, by something which carries
passengers across so close to it as to disturb the right, an action would be for
that disturbance. The cases, so far as I remember them, in which actions
have lain for the interference with, or disturbance of, the right of ferry,
have been where there has been a carrying across by boats. But I cannot
bring my mind to doubt the principle that if a bridge vere to be ere&ed
across a ferry, and people were to go across the bridge, and consequently the
bridge would have the effect of disturbing the owner of the ferry in his
right, he would be entitled to bring an action on the case, and to recover
damages.'
It is clear that the point of difference between Blackburn, J., and Mellish,
J., is that the former interprets the old cases broadly as holding that the interference of any kind of competition is actionable, while the latter construes
them strictly as holding only competition by ferrying is actionable.
[19o8] i Ch. 6I (Eng.). For a complete note on the application of the
principle in the United States see an excellent note in i Brit. Ruling Cases,
341; also I Lewis Eminent Domain, §216 (3d ed.).
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bridge was built at the very landing place of the ancient ferry, so
as to enable persons to travel from the highway on which one
terminus of the ferry was situated. In such a case he thought
that the ferryman might have relief. The whole tenor of this
excerpt is similar to that which prevailed in the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in the Charles River Bridge Case. 5
2. Every ferry is not an ancient ferry, notwithstanding the
remark in Stark v. McGowen 86 thiat "the distinction which was
attempted to be made between ancient ferries, and those by
express grant, is without foundation; for when a ferry is prescribed for, it is upon the ground that there was originally a
grant which is presumed to have been made after a continued
use of many years". It may be that a ferry by express grant is
equivalent to an ancient ferry, but not necessarily so, for it will
depend upon the obligation imposed upon the holder of the ferry
franchise. The obligation imposed upon the owner of an ancient
ferry, which after all was the benefit to the public at large, is the
basis of the rights of ancient ferries. The ancient ferry franchise
is in derogation of common right, but "as compensation for that
derogation of common right, there is this great advantage to
the public, that they have at all times at hand, by reason of the
ferry, the means of travelling on the King's highway, of which
the ferry forms a part; for the owner of the ferry is under the
obligation of always providing proper boats, with competent
boatmen, and all other things necessary for the maintenance of
the ferry in an efficient state and condition for the use of the
public

.

. .".7

The distinction between a ferry under a legislative grant
and an ancient ferry is nowhere better brought out than in Letton
v. Godden.ss In this case the plaintiff, the owner of a certain
ferry provided for by an Act of Parliament, brought a bill to
restrain the defendant from interfering with his right to an
"Supra, note 77.
Supra, note 54. In this particular case the owner of the ferry by legislative grant was under the same obligations as the owner of an ancient ferry.
"Letton v. Godden, supra, note 2.
u Ibid.

734

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

exclusive ferry from certain termini. Vice Chancellor Kindersley
refused the bill because the plaintiff did not stand upon the same
footing as the owner of an ancient ferry. "The right conferred
on the plaintiff by the act was very limited and restricted. The
right only applied to ferrying on Sundays, and although it was
possible to conceive such a thing as a Sunday ferry, giving the
right to convey the inhabitants of a parish to their parish church,
on the other side of the river, there is nothing of the kind here."
And lastly, the plaintiff was under no obligation to provide either
sufficient boats or boatmen and could abandon his right whenever
he pleased to do so. Hence if he was not subject to the obligation
he could have no protection from competition for his claim was
against common right."9
It was not always certain whether the failure of the ancient
ferryman to fulfill his obligation would deprive him of his right
to be free from ferry competition. The early law appears to be
very precise in holding the man to his obligation. Sir Edward
Coke, in speaking of the toll murage, which was taken in consideration of the upkeep of the wall of the town for defensive
purposes, said: "But if a wall be made which is not defensible,
nor a safeguard of the people, then ought not this toll to be paid,
for the end of the grant of prescription is not performed." 90 By
this reasoning no man could claim the toll for ferrying if he did
not fulfill his obligation. And if he could not claim the toll, then
surely he could not possibly be permitted to deprive any one else
of ferrying if he were not willing to fulfill the conditions which
were solely responsible both for his right to collect toll and right
to be free from competition.
However, in Blissett v. Hart9 this reasoning is not followed. Here the plaintiff, owner of an ancient ferry, brought
an action upon the case for damage from competition by the new
ferry. The defendant objected to the declaration because it did
not "aver in the declaration that the plaintiff kept boats and
" For the importance which is attached to the obligation of ancient ferrymen, see Londonderry Bridge Comm. v. McKeever, 27 L. R. Ir. 464 (C. A.
i8go) ; General Estates Co. v. Beaver, supra, note 63, in the opinion of Reading, C. J., at page 96r.
" Coke's Second Institute, 22.
"Supra, note 72.
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ferrymen sufficient to carry goods and passengers over the river".
The court overruled this objection but gave no reason in the
opinion filed. From a footnote which is found at the end of the
case in the report, it is evident that Lord Chief Justice Willes
thought any such suggestion was out of place in a civil suit, but
ought to be called to the attention of the Attorney General, who
would proceed by indicment. All that is necessary to aver for
such protection is that the plaintiff is in possession of an ancient
ferry. The iame result was reached in Peter v. Kendal,92 where
there was a similar action and the defendant proved that until
he had set up his boat the ferry had been badly served and the
public sustained much inconvenience. But to this Mr. Justice
Bayley, in upholding the verdict for the plaintiff, replied:
"It is then said that the neglect of the plaintiff has destroyed his right to the ferry. I am of the opinion that neglect
does not, ipso facto, destroy the right to the franchise. The
proceeding by quo warranto supposes the party in actual,
though not legal possession, and therefore judgment of ouster
is necessary to dispossess him. In the case of an abuse of a
franchise by negligence, the Crown may repeal the grant by
scire facias or quo warranto, and may vest it in some other
person, if that is thought necessary. But mere negligence in
the party in whom the ferry is vested does not destroy the
right."
In equity the rule is the same, and the chancellor will not
go into the collateral question of whether the ancient ferryman
lived up to the obligations when he is seeking protection by
injunction. Although Lord Hardwicke, in a comparatively early
case, 93 did refuse such an injunction "because the plaintiffs had
not shown that they had kept up sufficient ferryboats", neverthe94
less this is not the law today as evidenced by the latest decisions.
While such a ruling may be criticised on the ground that both at
law and in equity it protects the dog in the manger, nevertheless
there are proper judicial avenues open for the correction of any
"6 B. & C. 703 (Eng.

1827).

"Dean of Durham's Case, i Ves. Sr. Chan. Rep. 476 (Eng. 1750).
" Dysart v. Hammerton, infra, note 95; General Estates Co. v. Beaver,
supra, note 63, at pages 964 and 968.
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just complaints on the part of the people and it is better for all
concerned not to have these separate and distinct issues confused
in one case.
3. The doctrine of "new traffic" is the result of a clash of
two legal principles in respect to ancient ferries. The one is that
the ferry has a monopoly of crossing the river by boat, the other
that the ferry is established for the convenience of the public.
The great question always is, how far must the ferryman give
way to the convenience of the public, for it is evident from the
cases which protected the ancient ferryman that the ease of a
few people cannot alone be considered public convenience.
In order better to understand the problem it will be helpful
to separate the two classes of ferry franchises in respect to the
monopoly. These two classes are: (A) from vill to vill; (B)
from highway to highway, or, as more commonly called, from
point to point.
A. The franchise of an ancient ferry from vill to vill was
one of the greatest monopolies known to the law, and only a few
such franchises were ever reported in the cases. 5 It is, therefore, important to understand what a vill is, and in a footnote is
appended an excellent quotation from a very recent English case
which thoroughly explains the origin and use of the term. 90
'Phillmore, L. J., in General Estates Co. v. Beaver, supra, note 63, at
page 964, mentions Trippe v. Frank, supra, and Huzzey v. Field, supra. But
there are others such as Pim v. Currell, 6 M. & W. 234 (Eng. 184o); Cory v.
Yarmouth, etc., Rwy., 3 Hare, 593 (Eng. 1844); Matthews v. Peache, 5 E. &
B. 546 (Eng. 1855); Newton v. Cubitt, 12 C. B. N. S. 32 (Eng. 1862); Cowes
v. Packet Co., [198o] 2 K. B. 287; Dysart v. Hammerton, Iio L. T. 879

(Eng. 1914).

" Phillmore, L. J., in General Estates Co. v. Beaver, supra, note 63, at
page 964, "The word [vill], at one time in much use in legal matters, has
almost dropped out of use in our later jurisprudence. But from Co. Litt.
xi5b; Viner's Abridgement, title Vill, and, with reference to the choice of
juries, under the title Trial, number Za, and following; Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, bk. ii, ch. 3, Elphinstone on Deeds, pp. 168
and 624; and the cases of Stark v. Fox (Cro. Jac. 120), Lawrence v. Johns
(Cro. Jac. 274), Wilson v. Law (i Ld. Ra. 20), and Addison v. Otway
(i Mod. 250, 258; 2 Mod. 233), sufficient light on the subject can be gathered.

"For the purpose of the decisions I think the conclusion which I am
about to state, though by no means exhaustive, will suffice. Every borough
corporate or city is a viii, or, as Pollock and Maitland say, a group of vills.
It seems to me possible that in cities where there are ancient divisions into
Outside municipal corporawards the ward may take the place of the vill.
tions the rest of the country was supposed to be divided into country vills,was not always, but generally, coterminous
villac cam pestres. A country vill
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From this historical discussion the learned Lord Justice concludes
that a vill was: "A defined legal area, in respect of which a
franchise could be granted without uncertainty ;97 and when the
franchise of a ferry from vill to vill was granted, the vill might
either be a corporate borough or a villa campestris; and it would
seem to follow that, as the franchise is recognized in the law as
a distinct franchise, so it gave the privilege and involved the duty

of providing as many suitable lines of ferry as might be required
98
for communication between two vills."

But a mere franchise

to run from one town to another was not necessarily a vill to vill

franchise. This is well brought out by Mr. Justice Kennedy in
99
Cowes Urban Council v. Southhampton Steam Packet Company,
where there was a grant of a franchise from the Crown for "all
that ferry or right of passage across the River Medina between
East Cowes and West Cowes on the Isle of Wight". The owner
with a manor, and was thought of as having a lord. It had a defined circumscription and was the smallest civic area known to the law. The parish
had been originally regarded as an ecclesiastical area, and seems only to
have gradually acquired recognition as a unit of locality for temporal purposes; possibly not till the Statutes of Elizabeth (43 Eliz., c. 2) made it a
unit for poor law purposes. Wherever, therefore, any act had to be described
as done at a particular place, or a recovery of lands had to be suffered, or
the habitation of any person had to be described, the proper territorial
description was 'of such a vill in such county'; and though gradually the
parish superseded the vill as a more convenient territorial description thc
conservatism of the officers of the courts, as narrated in the case of Addison
v. Otway (2 Mod. 233), for a long time led them to refuse to use the word
'parish'. But in time, for convenience' sake, it was presumed that the parish
and vill were conterminous, unless the contrary was shown. The division
was carried to America. In New England the counties are divided into
'towns'; in the Central States of the United States into 'townships', as the
smallest civil areas., (See Fairlee on Local Government. The American States
Series, ch. 829.)"
"In Tripp v. Frank, 4 T. R. 666 (1792), the court would not support a
claim of franchise that was uncertain. The reason is that if it were uncertain the court could not well enforce the obligations to provide sufficient boats
and routes. A franchise which was not pleaded with certainty could not be
enforced.
"The same idea of larger obligations upon the owner of a vill to vill
case at
franchise is expressed by Lord Chief Justice Reading in the same
page 96I. It was one reason which made him reluctantly find for a vill to vill
franchise.
franchise
"[19o5] 2 K. B. 287 (Eng.). Other cases where a vill to vill; Matthews
has been denied are: Pim v. Currell, 6 M. & W. 234 (Eng.12i84o)
C. B. N. S. 32
v. Peache, 5 E. & B. 546 (Eng. 1855); Newton v. Cubitt,
was discussed
(Eng. 1862) ; Dysart v. Hammerton, supra, note 9s. The point
593, 602
but not decided in Corry v, Yarmouth & Norwich Rwy. Co., 3 Hare.

(Eng. 1844).
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of this franchise in a bill to restrain infringement argued that
both East and West Cowes should be treated as vills. But the
Justice refused so to hold on the ground that from the maps
produced in evidence it was clear that these places were districts
and not vills. And he went further and ruled "that the Crown
could not make a valid grant of a monopoly of ferriage throughout such a district".1 00 The usual way of declaring a ferry right
in a suit for infringement is to declare in the alternative; that is,
that the plaintiff is possessed of an ancient ferry from vill to vill,
or is possessed of an ancient ferry from point A to point B. The
court then will determine, largely from usage, whether the franchise claimed is a vill to vill or only a point to point. 101
As the legal protection from monopoly in this vill to vill
class of ferry, extends to the limits of the vill, it is evident that
there cannot be much chance for the justification of competition
under the doctrine of "new traffic". This is well brought out in
Huzzey v. Field'0 2 and the recent case of General Estates Company v. Beaver.10 3 In the former the main highway from
Haverford to Pembroke passed by. Mayland, thence over the
waters to Pembroke Point, and then inland for two miles to
Pembroke. The plaintiff had a vill to vill ferry from Mayland to
Pembroke. The defendant ran a ferry from Mayland to Peter
Dock, a half-mile down from Pembroke Point, but on a new road
to Pembroke. One day the defendant ferried a person to Peter
Dock who while he was afloat said he was going to Pembroke.
The court regarded this as a new ferry from Mayland to Peter
Dock and hence no infringement of the plaintiff's ferry, they
having disregarded the passenger's statements after he was
afloat. But the court went into the question very thoroughly and
1" The basis of this dictum is found in the argument of Mr. Cresswell
and the answer thereto by Baron Maule in Pim v. Currell, "upra, note 99,
at pages 259 and 26o; and in Newton v. Cubitt, supra, note 99, at page 58.
"I For such forms of declaration and methods of determining whether the
franchise is from viii to vill or not, see Pim v. Currell, supra, note 99;
Newton v. Cubitt, supra, note 99; Matthews v. Peache, supra, note 9g; Cowes
v. Southampton, etc., Steam Packet Co., supra, note 95; Earl of Dysart v.
Hammerton, supra, note 95; General Estates Co. v. Beaver, supra, note 63.
1022 C. M. & R. 432 (Eng. 1835).
' Supra, note 63.
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laid down some rules which will hereafter be referred to. The
reason for the thorough discussion was "that it may not be supposed that the decision to which we find ourselves obliged to
come, can in any manner affect the plaintiff's right to the exchtsiz'e
privilege of ferrying passengers who leave Mayland, with no
other object than that of going to Pembroke". Here it is evident
that although Peter Dock was a half mile from Pembroke Point,
yet if the defendant had known that the passenger intended to
go to Pembroke, it would have been an infringement. The distance made no difference, nor the opening of the new highway
from Peter Dock to Pembroke.
In the latter case the plaintiff claimed a franchise from the
vill of Great Yarmouth, in the County of Norfolk, across the
Yare to the vill of Little Yarmouth and Gorleston, in the County
of Suffolk. After much argument both in the King's Bench and
Court of Appeals the judges decided that it was a vill to vill
franchise, considering Little Yarmouth and Gorleston as one vill.
The plaintiffs operated two ferries, "Upper Ferry" and "Lower
Ferry", about sixteen hundred yards apart. The defendant's
ferry was located between these two, about four hundred yards
above the "Lower Ferry". The justification was that the towns
had developed so rapidly since the new fishing industry had
grown up that this ferry was serving a new traffic. As the offending ferry was situated within the limits of the vill and as the court
had decided that the claim of the plaintiff to a viii to vill franchise
was sustained by evidence and rules of presumption, they never
considered the question of new traffic and change of circumstances. 1"' It was only when the justices were considering the
' Phillmore, L. J.,'disposed of this- new traffic argument as being applicable to a viii to vill ferry, as follows: "Assuming that in certain cases the
connection of new highways coming down to the water on either side by new
lines of ferry may not be a disturbance of a point to point ferry, still if
these new highways come from and to parts of the area of the vills which
are the subject of the franchise, it follows from the nature of the franchise
that the owner has the duty of exercising it so as to comply with any reasonable convenience of the public, and corresponding privilege of preventing
others from taking his place." This is the correct view of a viii to vill franchise and it sets aright the false impression given by Willes J., in his dictum
in Newton v. Cubitt, supra, note 99, at page 58. He was under the impression
that a viii to vill franchise could not prevail against new traffic within the
vills. He lost sight of the fact that a viii to viii ferry does exist in respect
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alternative claim of the plaintiffs, that at least they had two point
to point ferries, did they consider the doctrine of change of
circumstances and new traffic.
The only conceivable form of change which could possibly
prevail against a vill to viii franchise is that which is mentioned
by Lord Justice Mellish in Hopkins v. Great Northern Railway;i0 5 that is, a change in the mode of travel. In this case the
diversion of traffic was caused by the railroad bridge, and also a
footbridge which enable intending passengers to cross the river
for nothing. Here the new traffic was not caused by a change
in circumstances in the neighborhood, "but there was a general
change of circumstances in the country at large which rendered
this new highway [the railroad] necessary, not only or principally for the accommodation of the persons who formerly used
the ferry, but for the accommodation of a much larger number
of the public".
B. A point to point ferry runs from the termnini of a highway, and has no set geographical lines of monopolistic protection
as does the vill to vill franchise. The doctrine of limiting the
range of these ferries grew from the 'old idea which is always
prevalent; namely, that of the public obligations of the ferryman
and public convenience. The law is said to have had its origin
with Lord Kenyon in Tripp v. Frank.'0 6 The plaintiff in this
action on the case for infringement was possessed of an ancient
vill to vill ferry from Hull across the Humber to Barton. The
defendant, possessed of an ancient ferry from Hull to Barrow,
carried several persons to Barrow, two miles below Barton. It
was held that the plaintiff could not recover. Lord Kenyon
admitted that if the passenger had wanted to go to Barton, the
to the land and has a monopoly of all the traffic in the vill. He said "The
ferry is unconnected with the occupation of the land, and exists only in
respect to the persons using the right of way". This is only true of a point
to point ferry and is not true of a vill to viii ferry. Phillmore, L. J., brings
it out very clear where he distinguishes these two classes of franchises: "ff
the owner of a point to point ferry can always stop any one from ferrying in
his line, by parity of reason the owner of a vill to vill ferry should be able
to restrain ferrying over his area."
20

Supra, note 82.

'0 Supra, note 97.
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mere fact that the defendant carried them above or below the
landing of the plaintiff's ferry would have made no difference.
It would have been, as he states it, "a fraud on the plaintiff's
right" for the plaintiff had an exclusive (vill to vill) franchise.
But the person did not want to go to Barton, "and it is absurd to
say that no person shall be permitted to go to any place on the
Humber than that to which the plaintiff chooses to carry them".
The court in order to protect the rights of the public was
compelled to find for the defendant. As the plaintiff could be
compelled to carry passengers only from Hull to Barton, the
public would have been forced to cross the ferry to Barton and
then walk down two miles to Barrow. This was unreasonable,
and as it "is now admitted that the ferryman cannot be compelled
to carry passengers to any other place than Barton, then this right
must commensurate with his duty".
The same idea is brought out in Huizey v. Field,0 7 which
has been discussed before. All that Lord Abinger wanted to
impress was that a vill to vill franchise was an exclusive monopoly
only between the vills and not between the vill on one side and all
the towns on the other side surrounding the other vill, for he
said:
"It does not follow from this doctrine [that a vill to vill
franchise is exclusive], that, if there be a river passing by
several towns or places, the existence of a franchise of a ferry
over it, from a certain point on the one side to a certain point
on the other, precludes the King's subjects from the use of the
river as a public highway from or to all the towns or places on
its banks, and obliges them, upon all occasions, to their own
inconvenience, to pass from one terminus of the ferry to the
other."
It has been thought advisable to discuss these two cases at
the outset, for although they do involve the question of new traffic
and are cited as authorities for the rule, nevertheless they are
really cases defining the limits of the protection of a vill to vill
franchise.
One of the hardest questions in the law is to determine the
extent of protection that is to be afforded a point to point ferry.
1" Supra, note io2.
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It is certain that the owner of a ferry from A to B could enjoin
any one who set up a new ferry adjoining the termini; and in
Churchman v. Tvnstal,'0 8 a ferry operating within three-quarters
of a mile from an ancient ferry was enjoined. It is also certain
that there is a limit to this legal protection, for one cannot have a
monopoly of a whole shore. What this limit is the authorities
do not define.
Fleta states that no new market could be set up within seven
miles. This distance was based on a calculation of a person
travelling twenty miles a day, and hence he allowed seven miles
out and seven miles back, with time for marketing. 0 9 This
arbitrary limit being based on the above reason might be suited
to the simple wants of a rude life, where the inhabitants are few,
says Mr. Justice Miller,"1 0 "but is unfitted for large towns, where
daily wants are greatly multiplied. Under the latter circumstances, it seems that the area within which a new market would
become actionable, would be diminished from a diameter of fourteen miles by the public needs; and on the same reasoning, the
area of a monopoly of a ferry would depend on the need of the
public for passage."
In every case to solve the territorial limit of actionable
proximity two main considerations must be balanced. The first
consideration is "the advantage of preserving an ancient ferry,
with the duties and liabilities of its owner, its fixed moderate
tolls, and the obligation to serve at all hours and in all weathers,
and the reasonable rights of the owner to the franchise, including
his right to share in the improvements in the neighborhood".
The other consideration is "the reasonable convenience of the
public, when new highways bring them down to the waters' edge
with corresponding new highways on the other side, in which
case they may fairly complain if they are compelled to make an
unreasonable detour"."'
'

Supra, note 47.

'Lib. IV, ch. 28, §13.
"*
Newton v. Cubitt, supra, note 99, at page 6o.
11.2
Quotations are from the opinior of Phillmore, L. J., in General Estates
Co. v. Beaver, supra, note 63, at page 968.
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The basis of the doctrine of new traffic or change of circumstances is found in Newton v. Cubitt,1 2 the celebrated Isle of
Dogs Case. For the sake of convenience two possible divisions
can be made here; namely, (a) new traffic due to the change in
the circumstances of the neighborhood; (b) new traffic due to
the change in the mode of travel.
(a) In the Isle of Dogs Case, the Ferry Society tried for
the fourth time to establish their claim to an exclusive ferry from
the Isle to Greenwich-and failed." 3 This island, about one
square mile, is situated on the banks of the Thames, across from
Greenwich. For a long time it was only a marsh, uninhabited
except by persons working the ferry and a few cattlemen. In
1812 there was only one road through it, Manor Way, which
ran from Potters Ferry Stairs on the southerly end of the island
in a northerly direction to the town of Poplar. The Ferry Stairs
was the only means of access to a ferry between the Isle and
Greenwich. About 183o new factories, workshops and houses
grew up on the island. The defendant in this case bought a large
plot of ground on the east side of the island which abutted the
Thames, called it Cubitt Town, and built houses and factories.
Cubitt Town had about three thousand inhabitants. He also constructed a pier from which he started to run his ferry. This
pier was by shore three-fourths of a mile, by road about seventenths of a mile, away from the plaintiff's ferry. There was no
road connecting Cubitt Town with Manor Way except that which
the defendant dedicated. The distance from Poplar to Cubitt
Town was one and a half miles.
The plaintiff declared that the defendant operated a ferry
near to the plaintiff's for the reason of diverting traffic. At the
trial it was proved that the defendant had acted bona fide and
had erected the ferry for the convenience of the inhabitants of
Cubitt Town. But it was also proved that the defendant not only
carried the inhabitants of Cubitt Town, but also other persons
'"Supra, note 99.
The three other cases are: Giles v. Groves, 12 Q. B. 721, 6 D. & L. 146,
17 L. J. Q. B. 273 (Eng. 1848) ; Blackeler v. Gillett, 9 C. B. 26 (Eng_ i85o) ;
Matthews v. Peache, supra, note 99. A history of these cases is given on
pages 39 and 4o of the report of Newton v. Cubitt, supra, note 99.
u"
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who would have otherwise travelled to Greenwich by the plaintiff's ferry. However, these people (with one or two exceptions)
did not live at Poplar, but merely worked on the island nearer to
the defendant's ferry than plaintiff's ferry.
In holding that the defendant was not guilty, Mr. Justice
Willes laid the foundation of this famous rule. After noting
that the defendant had acted bona fide, and that there was no
known test to determine the actionable proximity of a new ferry,
he said:
"It seems reasonable to infer, that, if the franchise of a
ferry is established for the facility of passage, and if the
monopoly is given to secure convenient accommodation, a change
of circumstances creating new highways on land would carry
with it a right to continue the line of those ways across a water
highway; and it is obvious that the single landing-place which
sufficed for an uninhabited marsh, would be utterly inadequate
for several towns thronged with industrial mechanics. If one
hundred of such laborers pass now to Greenwich where one
traveller passed in i8oo, it seems oppressive to fix on such a
large number of laborers the perpetually repeated loss of threequarters of a mile of walking, for the sake of the small fraction
of the toll which is the profit on each passenger, and unreasonable so to increase that profit."
The noticeable thread which runs throughout this quotation
is "public convenience". Never for a moment does the learned
Justice once consider the corresponding right on the part of ferryman to benefit in the development of the island. It is a one-sided
view of the question, and does not weigh the rights of one against
the rights of the other. It may well be that the geographical situation made it impossible for him to hold otherwise, but at least
he did not give much weight to that reason. His main theme
was the public convenience which is plainly seen in the statement
of his idea of the rule: "If the public convenience requires a new
passage at such a distance from the old ferry as makes it to be a
real convenience to the public, the proximity seems to us not
actionable."
Not only did the justice refuse to consider the right of the
plaintiffs' benefit in the reasonable growth of the community, but
would not even protect him from the diversion of the former
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patrons from Poplar, for he held that all at Cubitts Pier, whether
they come from Poplar or elsewhere had the right to use the
Thames either to Greenwich or elsewhere at their free will by
ferry or steamer.
The same idea of public convenience is brought out in Dixon
v. Curwen.1 4 Here the defendants had leased an ancient ferry
plying across Lake Windemere from A to B, which was about a
mile from Bowness, to the plaintiff, and agreed to allow no "opposition ferry" to land on the property. However, the defendants
did grant to a ferry which ran up and down the lake the right
to stop at A and carry passengers to Bowness, and vice versa.
The plaintiffs brought a bill to enforce the contract, contending
that this was an "opposition ferry". The Master of the Rolls
dismissed the bill because there was no legal interference with the
plaintiffs' rights. The mere fact that the plaintiffs had a ferry
from A to B did not oblige the people to cross from one terminus
to the other, "on all occasions, to their own inconvenience". The
case is poorly reported and the facts do not show whether there
was a road from B to Bowness, but if there was, then it is very
doubtful whether the case is good law. It certainly does not
agree with the well considered ruling of Huzzey v. Field."5
The next case was Cowes Urban Council v. Southampton
Steam Packet Company,"6 where the plaintiffs were lessees from
the Crown of an ancient ferry on the Isle of Wight from a point
in West Cowes across the Medina River to East Cowes. Since
1901 the ferrying had been carried on by steam bridges, barges
and rowboats. The defendants were owners of steamboats
which ran from the mainland to West Cowes. Their ferry across
the Medina was situated at West Cowes about one-half mile
north of the ancient ferry, and at East Cowes about one-eighth
mile to the north, and was used both by patrons in East Cowes
who wished to make a through trip to the mainland and by persons who merely wished to cross from West to East Cowes and
11 [877.] Weekly Notes, 4 (Eng.). The case is very short and the
Master of the Rolls did not go into a thorough discussion of the matter.
"' Supra, note 102.
2' Supra, note 99.
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vice versa. The defendants' landing at West Cowes was nearer
the seaside and the fashionable part of the town; and a railway
which ran to points on the Isle of Wight had a terminus near it
and had made suitable transfer arrangements. At East Cowes
their landing was near Osbourne, which had lately grown up, and
the northern part of the town. Since 1902 the traffic between the
towns had increased immensely, due to the fact that a pier was
established near the defendants' West Cowes' landing, where
excursionists from the mainland alighted. The plaintiffs' business during all this time had been progressive. Their ferry could
accommodate all that used it and more if the passengers, to use
Mr. Justice Kennedy's finding, "had disregarded their own convenience and had gone out of their way to follow the steam
bridge route".
The plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin the defendants from
ferrying those people of East Cowes who wished to make a
through trip to the mainland, recognizing the ruling made by
Lord Justice Mellish in Hopkins v. Great Northern Railway," 7
but they did contend that the defendants were otherwise interfering with their ancient ferry. The court, however, thought
that the traffic which the defendants were carrying was new
traffic, and hence there could be no interference. Apart from the
locating of the railway terminus near the defendants' ferry, and
the establishment of the Royal Naval College, and the opening of
Osbourne to the visitors, "there has grown up and now exists in
West Cowes, to the west and north of the defendants' ferry, a
number of residents who could not, without considerable inconvenience, lose the advantage of that ferry".
It is very evident that Mr. Justice Kennedy was led by the
opinion of Mr. Justice Willes which he quoted at length. He,
too, only considered the public convenience. The mere fact that
people would have to walk a half mile to the plaintiffs' ferry was
sufficient to justify a new line of carriage. He never considered
that plaintiffs might have been compelled to establish another line
where the defendants were now, and if they might have been
. Supra, note 82.
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compelled, they surely were entitled to protection. He thought
that the traffic from all these sources was new traffic, for the reason-and this is the new theory advanced by him-"that the
traffic on the ancient ferry is at the same time not diminishing
but an increasing and progressive traffic." The fact that the
traffic of the ancient ferry has not diminished but grown can
have nothing to do with the question of actionable interference
and received the earnest denunciation of Lord Chief Justice Reading in a recent case." 8
With the advent of the Earl of Dysart v. Hammerton,"19
the doctrine of "public convenience" is greatly limited and the
corresponding right of the ancient ferryman is considered. The
plaintiff was possessed of an ancient ferry from Twickenham to
Ham. A few years before the bill was brought, Parliament had
empowered various public bodies to preserve the view from
Richmond Hill, and accordingly Marble Hill Park, on the Twickenham side was purchased and improved. On the Ham side of
the river the Earl had converted an old foot path into a public
recreation ground where many visitors came on holidays. The
defendant's ferry was situated near the recreation park and the
plaintiff's was more than a quarter of a mile away. Any person
who wanted to cross to Marble Hill Park would have had to go
a quarter of a mile up the stream to the ancient ferry and when
across would have had to come back a quarter of a mile. The
majority of passengers carried by the defendant were pleasure
seekers to whom the ferry was a real convenience, although other
people were carried. The lower court following the above considered cases, refused the injunction on the ground of new traffic. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Lord CozenHardy, Master of the Rolls, placed a limitation upon public convenience when he ruled that "the mere fact that it would be convenient for persons living 5oo yards away from the ancient ferry
is not in itself sufficient". There must be more than a mere personal convenience to each person using the ferry. In fact there
" General Estates Co. v. Beaver, supra, note 63, at page 963.
' t Supra, note 95.
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must be a new traffic and the importance of this case is that it
holds that public convenience alone cannot create this new traffic.
Lord Justice Phillmore, in his concurring opinion, points
out the real fact which is to determine the right of new ferry
lines. He quoted that part of Mr. Justice Willes' opinion which
stated that the creation of new highways on land will give the
right to create new ferry lines to connect them. He then remarked that in the case under consideration there was no such
highway on the land created since the promenade dedicated by
the Earl could not be considered such a highway. He also
pointed out that in the Cowes Case, which was never acted upon
by the Court of Appeal, there were new highways created on the
120
land which distinguished it from the case at bar.
This case then brings out in bold relief the fact that new
highways must be created on land, which ought to be united by
a ferry for the public convenience; and that public convenience
in and of itself will not create new traffic.
The broad doctrine of public convenience received its death
blow at the hands of Lord Chief Justice Reading in an opinion
handed down in February of this year in General Estates Company v. Beaver,'21 where he said:

"It may well be that it would be convenient to some members of the public to have another ferry a little higher up, or a
little lower down. Every one would prefer to be ferried directly
across the river without having to walk some distance along
the bank to or from the ferry, but that convenience in itself is
an insufficient reason for holding that the establishment by
another of a ferry in the proximity of an ancient ferry is not
an interference with the right of the owner."
'Buckeley, L. J., dissented, and at page 886 laid down a new test: "It
is essential, I think, to discriminate between, first, traffic (indluding increased

traffic due to altered circumstances), which, having regard to the approaches

of the river theretofore existing, would naturally go to the plaintiff's ferry,
and secondly, traffic which for want of better accommodation must go to
the plaintiff's ferry, because there is not such a new communication, as, if
that be the case, the public convenience properly demands. The ferry owner

is entitled to the former, that is the traffic which would go, but not to the
latter, that is the traffic which must go for want of better accommodations,

to his ferry."

The weakness of this test is the inability to distinguish

between those who "would naturally go" and those who "must go". Where
a- new ferry is created it would be almost impossible to separate the two

groups.
' Supra, note 63, at page 962.
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The Chief Justice then explained that the term "public convenience" as used by Mr. Justice Willes in the Isle of Dogs Case,
could not possibly mean that it would merely be convenient to the
people at the north end of the island and at Cubitt's Town to have
a ferry across the Thames in proximity to the ancient ferry. But
it must be understood in the light of the facts and that public
convenience can only arise when new highways of traffic have
been established on the land. Lord Justice Phillmore explained
the expression in the same manner. He also pointed out that in
that case, none of the traffic was connected with the old Manor
Way leading from the Stairs to Poplar, but it was fresh traffic
from a new town, requiring a totally different line of ferrying.
It is not contended that this interpretation of the facts is not better than that given by Mr. Justice Willes himself, but it is believed that the idea of new lines of traffic on the land was not
the prominent thought in his mind, but rather the convenience
of the public. He argued that as the public through the Crown
had created the ferry for their convenience, they could easily
enough create a new one.
The other important point of this case is the emphasis placed
upon the right of the ferryman to insist upon his privilege to
share in the growth of the community. In speaking of this, the
Lord Chief Justice said that the ancient ferryman has a right
to say to those who want to be ferried across, "you must cross
by my ancient ferry; here am I, possessed of this right, and I
provide a suitable boat and charge a reasonable toll and am liable
to be indicted if I fail to perform my obligations to the public in
return for my exclusive right of ferry". If the ferryman did
not have this right, an ancient ferry from point to point would
confer no legal right except at the exact line of crossing.
Some of the facts have already been recited, but there are
others which have an important bearing on this subject. Up
until 1867 the important industry of these towns, the herring
fishery, was carried on by sailing trawlers and drifters; now it
is carried on by steam drifters. Instead of being smoked, the
herring are now pickled, and consequently there has been an increase in this industry. About twenty thousand people come to
these towns during fishing season. There had also been an in-
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crease in shipbuilding and naval engineering work. New parts
of the towns had been laid out with streets and houses on both
sides of the banks. It was estimated that the workers who
crossed in the defendant's ferry, if compelled to use the plaintiff's,
would have an extra walk of at least three-fourths of a mile a
day. Surely if the growth of the town and the public convenience
were the sole guides, no person was more justified than the defendant in this case and so the court thought. But the ancient
ferryman is also to be considered and he has the right to have
his ferry grow with the community. Why should he be deprived
of any part of it because the right has become more valuable due
to the increase of population and extension of the works? "It
is old traffic in the sense that it is old industry, which is being
carried on by new and different methods. It is old traffic under
altered circumstances and different conditions. In the ordinary
and natural course of human affairs population will increase, new
houses will be built, progress in methods and extension of industries will take place, and that is what has happened here." The
court pointed out, that if the ferry accommodations were not
such as they should be, the plaintiff can be compelled to improve
the service. But he is the one to gain the increased business and
no other.
It is true that the parts of the opinion of Lord Chief Justice
Reading and Lord Justice Phillmore, which deal with the question of actionable proximity and limit the ruling of Mr. Chief
Justice Willes in the Isle of Dogs Case and practically repudiate
the Cowes Case, can be considered obiter, because they had
already decided that it was a vill to vill franchise; nevertheless,
one cannot read these well considered opinions without being impressed that what has been said is well grounded law.
Under the subhead of new traffic caused by a change of circumstances in the neighborhood, another point may be well discussed, and this may be termed a change in the character of the
patrons. It was first noticed in the Cowes Case, where one of
the reasons given for new traffic was that a great many of the
defendant's patrons were excursionists who came to West Cowes.
While Mr. Justice Kennedy did not remark about it, this class
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of traffic was totally different from what the ancient ferryman
had been used to handling, for his trade was composed of citizens of East and West Cowes. This distinction was given an
impetus by Lord Justice Phillmore in Dysart v. Hammerton.12 2
Here most of the defendants' patronage was from the pleasure
seekers and excursionists. Referring to this, he said:
"As to the ferriage of the first class, I have been in considerable doubt. Ferries in their inception were for people on
business and not on pleasure bent. The pleasure-seekers, the
exercise-taker, was an exceptional case. It is possible to regard
the river [the Thames] in this respect as if it was an artificial
piece of water, like the Serpentine, bisecting a pleasure ground.
If the defendants had proved

.

.

. that they had ferried

persons resorting to the park and not otherwise,-or rather, if
it had not been proved against them that they did more, I
should have been in doubt whether any injunction ought to have
been granted."
But this can no longer be urged as a justification, for in the
recent case this argument was used in behalf of the defendant.
The justice replied that he had gone very far in the former case
for special reasons and upon further consideration his doubt
had been greatly diminished and now thought that the unqualified
opinion of the Master of the Rolls was correct. If the expression "class of traffic" means that a new type of persons are traveling for a new purpose, there is no reason why this should justify
a new service. Indeed if this were not so, it would be denying
the ancient ferryman the right to share in the increase of the
neighborhood. It makes no difference what takes the passenger
across the ferry, work or play, the main point is that he crosses
and the ancient ferryman is entitled to his toll.
A rule may then be stated to be: In a point to point ferry
the actionable proximity is a question of fact to be decided by
all the circumstances, but that no new service can be justified
except on the ground that new highways of travel have been
created in the neighborhood which are separate and distinct from
the ones leading to the ancient ferry, and that it will be for the
convenience of the public to have these new highways connected.
1"Supra, note 95, at page 888.
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(b) The new traffic caused by a change in the mode of
travel can very easily create a change in the neighborhood. In
Hopkins v. Great Northern Railway Company,123 where the doctrine originated, the change in mode of travel caused a change
of circumstances in the neighborhood. The company built in
close proximity to the plaintiffs' ancient ferry a railroad which
crossed the river. The court had ruled that as the monopoly at
the best only protected the ferry from competition by other ferries, the railroad bridges could not be considered an infringement.
But Lord Justice Mellish went further than this. After remarking that the railroad had created a new highway on land and
created a new mode of travel, he ruled that even had the railway
bridge never been built, "but the railway company had established a new ferry for the purpose of conveying goods and passengers from their railway on the one side of the river to the
railway on the other side, it would not have been actionable, for
the railway would have been a new highway on land, which a
change of circumstances had rendered necessary, and it would
be reasonable that the new highway should be allowed to be continued over the water highway". True it is that there is a mere
obiter, yet is it not sound? Does it not follow the rule of Newton v. Cubitt 124 as restricted by Dysart v. Hamnierton125. and
General Estates Company v. Beaver?126 The only possible limitation that could be placed upon this ruling is that the passengers
127
are to be limited to the railway travelers.
Supra, note 82, at page 233.
lu'Supra, note 95.
12
'=

Supra, note 95.
Supra, note 63.

'The ferry in this ruling differs from the free bridge which was erected
along with the railroad bridge to accommodate the railway travelers. The
difference is that the bridge was no infringement at all, and although some
did cross who did not intend to travel by rail, yet the company was not
responsible for this. On the other hand, the ferry would be prima facie an
infringement and is only excused because it carries the traveler by rail who
would otherwise not cross. In such case the company would have to discriminate between the passenger by ferry and refuse to carry those who
did not intend to make a through journey by rail.
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The principle of new traffic caused by a through journey was
first enunciated in Hopkins v. Great Northern Railway,1 28 and
then recognized by the ancient ferryman's counsel in the Cowes
Case, 129 when he made an exception to that traffic between East
and West Cowes which he described as through traffic-that is,
persons who are carried across the Medina as a part of a continuous transit between East Cowes and the mainland, where that
part of the transit from the mainland to West Cowes has been
or is to be performed by the defendants' steamers. It is evident
that such traffic is entirely new to the ancient ferry, it was created
solely by the other ferryman and he is the one to benefit from it.
Douglass D. Storey.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.

'-

Supra, note 82.
Supra, note 99.

